The Danger of Somali Piracy (Biuletyn Opinie), Analizy FAE
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âBIULETYN OPINIEÒ
No 24/2009
The Danger of Piracy in Somalia
Elizabeth Deheza
Warsaw, August 2009
áBiuletyn OPINIEÑ,
AMICUS EUROPAE
Foundation, No 24/2009
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
The issue
The upsurge of the Somali piracy
Piracy off the coast of Somalia is growing at an alarming rate and threatens to drastically
disrupt international trade. Beyond the immediate threat that maritime piracy poses to crews,
property, and ships, it endangers sea lines of communication, interferes with freedom of navigation
and the free flow of commerce, and undermines regional stability by providing funds that feed the
vicious war in Somalia. Political and social development is corroded by piracy in Africa, disrupting
capital formation and economic development, fuelling corruption, and empowering private armies.
According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) Piracy Reporting Center, maritime
piracy has been on the rise for years. One of their latest reports states that in 2008 maritime piracy
has reached its highest level since they began tracking piracy incidents in 1992. Global piracy
increased 11 percent, and in the Gulf of Aden where 20,000 ships pass through each year
transporting cargo that includes 12 percent of the worldÔs daily oil supply
1
, piracy has increased 200
percent. Somalia, situated at the famous Horn of Africa, has one of the longest coast-lines in Africa:
from the border to Djibouti near the Bab el-Mandeb in the Gulf of Aden to Kenya at the East
African coast. The Somali coast stretches for roughly 3,300 kilometers. From a geostrategic
perspective, SomaliaÔs northeastern part along the Gulf of Aden to the Cape Guardafui Ï the very
Horn of Africa Ï is perfectly placed to control and possibly interdict shipping coming from or going
to the Red Sea. The much longer Bannadir Coast along SomaliaÔs Arabian Sea side is somewhat less
important, but still, the sea lines of communications (SLCs) Ï connecting the Red Sea to East Africa
and to South Africa Ï are particular important because it is there where most acts of piracy happen.
2
The so-called pirate capital of SomaliaÔs Puntland region is where the high seas hijackers often steer
their captured vessels. In 2005, the international community started to draw some attention on the
rapid insurgence of the Somali piracy. On 27 June, 2005 a 58-meter cargo ship was attack and the
crew was hijacked by Somali pirates in three fiberglass speedboats with powerful outboard motors,
armed with pistols, AK-47 assault rifles, and rocket-propelled grenades. The cargo was under charter
by the UN World Food Program to bring food aid to the Somali victims of the Boxing Day tsunami
on December 2004, carrying 850 tons of rice donated by Germany and Japan.
3
But in 2008, when
pirates operating off the coast of Somalia hijacked a Ukrainian ship MV Faina, full of Russian tanks,
they finally gained worldwide attention. After a four-month saga, $3.2 million in cash was dropped by
1
Kraska J., Wilson B.,
Fighting Pirates: The Pen and the Sword
, ÑWorld Policy JournalÒ No. 4, World Policy Institute, MIT,
2
Lehr P. & Lehmann H. (2007),
Somalia Ï PiratesÔ New Paradise
, London: Routledge for International Institute for
Strategic Studies, p. 2.
3
Ibid., p. 3.
2
áBiuletyn OPINIEÑ,
AMICUS EUROPAE
Foundation, No 24/2009
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
parachute to pay the ransom for the release of the ship in February 2009.
4
Some analysts suggest the
cost of ransoms could range between $1 billion and $16 billion a year. However, some experts on
piracy maritime terrorism, such as Martin N. Murphy, downgrade these losses since he believes that
$16 billion in losses is a small sum in comparison to annual global maritime commerce, with a net
worth well over trillions of dollars.
5
For many Somalis, especially marine experts and coastal dwellers, the current problem of
piracy began when foreign fishing boats started invading the countryÔs fishing grounds after the fall
of the Somali government in 1991. Since the various groups failed to fill in the vacuum and instead
turned on each other, foreign vessels took the opportunity to fish for diverse species in SomaliaÔs
territorial waters. These foreign boats come from a variety of countries such as Belize (French of
Spanish-owned purse seiners operating under a flag of convenience to avoid EU regulations); France
(purse seiners targeting tuna); Honduras; Japan (long-liners under license to Somaliland); Kenya
(Mombasa-based trawlers); Korea (long-liners targeting swordfish); Pakistan; Saudi Arabia; Sri Lanka
(trawlers, plus long-liners targeting shark under license to Somaliland and based at Berbera); Taiwan,
and Yemen (trawlers financed by a seafood importer in Bari, Italy).
6
Illegal fishing is a very lucrative
business worth approximately US$300 million per year. The illegal fishing activities conducted by
foreigners diverted much-needed resources away from SomaliaÔs coastal population. In the absence
of a central Somali government, the local fishing community turned to what they called Ñself-
defenseÒ. The frustration of young local fishermen brought them to attack foreign vessels and also
commercial cargo ships, which turned to be easier targets than foreign trawlers equipped with
similarly weapons that these fishermen use during their attacks. This set the basis for the SomaliaÔs
piracy.
Defining piracy: maritime piracy or maritime terrorism?
The IBM defines piracy as Ñan act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the
apparent intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use
force in the furtherance of that actÈPetty thefts are excluded, unless the thefts are armedÒ
7
. The
Unites Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) defines maritime piracy as:
Ñ
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the
passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
4
Gettleman J.,
Hijacked Arms Ship Limps Into Port
, ÑThe New York YimesÒ February 12, 2009.
spot&sq=&st=nyt
5
Murphy M. N. (2007),
Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism. The threat to international security
, London: Routledge for
International Institute for Strategic Studies. p. 161.
6
Coffen-Smout S.,
Pirates, Warlords and Rogue Fishing Vessels in SomaliaÔs Unruly Seas
.
7
Snoddon R. (2007),
Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: Naval Responses to Existing an Emerging Threats to the Global Seaborne
Economy
, London: Routledge for International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 228.
3
áBiuletyn OPINIEÑ,
AMICUS EUROPAE
Foundation, No 24/2009
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or
aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a
pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).
Ò
8
By the aforementioned definitions it can be stated that maritime piracy is an organized crime.
The degree to which it is a threat at any level, from the purely local to the international, depends on
the degree to which it is effectively organized
.
Piracy not only suppresses economic activity and
distorts economic incentives, but also lowers productivity, undermines confidence in authority and
the notion of justice.
Piracy at this level is what it has always been, a lucrative business. This form of
organized criminal behavior is not only linked with corruption, but it is also the main vehicle by
which criminal gangs achieve their aims and become well-renowned figures within their towns.
Nowadays, Somali pirates have learned how to effectively size big cargo ships and frighten unarmed
crews. These pirates are experienced, highly skilled, motivated, intelligent, and adaptable criminals
with key qualities such as aggression, speed, surprise, and control to carry on their attacks. They are
well equipped on every level: transport, communication, means of access, suitable weapons, and,
significantly, a defined objective and a plan of execution. These pirates are getting more and more
sophisticated acquiring automatic weapons including RPGs, satellite phones, navigation gear, and fast
fiberglass boats. Investing in this high-tech equipment brought with it higher mobility and more
lethality, thus enabling the pirates to gradually wide their range of possible targets from small and
slow inshore fishing vessels to larger offshore trawlers, and finally to international ships in even more
distant waters off the coast of Somalia.
On the methodology level, the pirates first identify the target Ï all vulnerable vessels and
cargo ships that transport high-value goods become potential victims for the attackers. Subsequently,
the pirates proceed to the boarding of the vessel by scaling the sides of the ship using poles, ladders,
or ropes. The best environment to execute these tasks is when the waters are calm and when it is
dark. Then, the ships are seized and the crew is taken as hostage, and finally ransoms are expected to
be paid for the exchange process. These pirates operate from mother ships, such as large blue-water
fishing boats or even small coastal general cargo vessels equipped to carry several smaller assault
crafts, which can be lowered into the water at a strategic time for assault, often during the early hours
of the morning, dusk or at night.
9
8
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
.
9
Herbert-Burns R. (2007),
Compound Piracy at Sea in the Early Twenty-First Century: A Tactical to Operational-Level Perspective on
Contemporary
, Multiphase Piratical Methodology, London: Routledge, p. 106.
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áBiuletyn OPINIEÑ,
AMICUS EUROPAE
Foundation, No 24/2009
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On the other hand, maritime terrorism is the Ñunlawful use or threatened use of force or
violence against people or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve
political, religious or ideological objectivesÒ
10
. Two clear examples of maritime terrorism were the
attacks on the NAGOT, the USS Cole, and on the MV Limbourb.
11
These were not piracy attacks,
but terrorist attacks aimed at specific targets, both military and economic. Even though, pirates could
benefit from this kind of terrorist acts, and eventually collaborate with terrorists groups for the same
outcome but for different aims, there is no evidence that suggest these terrorists are actively pursuing
piracy as a deliberate method of conflict.
12
Terrorists target their victims, pirates attacks appear to be
random and uncoordinated. An ongoing debate is trying to address the possible linkage between
piracy and maritime terrorism and to define pirates as ordinary criminals or as a quasi-military force.
When pirates attack a vessel using automatic weapons, take hostages, and commit murder, it is
difficult to know whether the attack is an act of terrorism or an act of piracy. Analyst, Peter Chalk,
believes that pirates are interested on material gain, while terrorists are Ñassumed to be seeking the
destruction of the global maritime trade network as part of their self-defined economic war against
the WestÒ
13
. Moreover, analyst, Martin N. Murphy, asserts that Ñthere is no worthwhile evidence,
despite the speculation, of any cooperation between pirates and insurgent/terroristsÒ
14
. On the other
hand, analyst, Douglas R. Burguess Jr, believes that there are links between piracy and terrorism,
ÑÈBoth crimes involve bands of brigands that divorce themselves from their nation-states and form
extraterritorial enclaves; both aim at civilians; both involve acts of homicide and destructionÒ
15
.
Burguess Jr suggests the U.S. and the international community to Ñadopt a new, shared legal
definition that would recognize the link between piracy and terrorismÒ
16
. However, another well-
known maritime security analyst, Robert Snoddon, like Murphy and Chalk, states that it is unlikely
terrorist groups will form an alliance with any external groups, and it is even less probable that they
would include pirates.
17
For instance, in the case of Horn of Africa, some reports confirm very loose
links between the indigenous terrorist organization Al Ittihad Al Islamiya (AIAI) and Somali pirates.
The looseness of this ÑcollaborationÒ may be due to the fact that Somali pirates belong to specific
10
Snoddon R. (2007),
Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: Naval Responses to Existing an Emerging Threats to the Global Seaborne
Economy
, London: Routledge for International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 228.
11
Ibid., p. 229.
12
Ibid., p. 229.
13
Chalk P.,
The Maritime Dimension of International Security Terrorism, Piracy, and Challenges for the United States
, The RAND
14
Murphy M. M.,
Suppression of Piracy and Maritime Terrorism
, ÑNaval War College ReviewÒ Number 3, Summer 2007, p. 31.
15
Burgess Jr. D. R
., Piracy Is Terrorism
, ÑThe New York TimesÒ December 5, 2008.
16
Ibid.
17
Snoddon R. (2007),
Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: Naval Responses to Existing an Emerging Threats to the Global Seaborne
Economy
, London: Routledge for International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 229.
5
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