The EU and the Western Balkans

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I
S
S
Opinion
Jacques
Rupnik*
May 2009
ThE EU and ThE WESTERn BalkanS
Photo session after session of the EU-Western Balkan Summit in Porto Carras, Greece, 21 June 2003. European Union leaders welcomed the Western Balkan countries to
talks on forging closer economic and political ties.
1. EU approach
Both during and in the immediate aftermath of the
wars that accompanied the break-up of Yugoslavia,
the European Union has been working on the coher-
ence of its approach towards the Western Balkans to
move from an agenda dominated by security issues
related to the dissolution of Yugoslavia to an agenda
focused on the Western Balkans’ EU accession pros-
pects.
The EU has simultaneously applied the widest pos-
sible range of different instruments to stabilizing the
Western Balkans and bringing the region close to the
EU: from Community funding to its military and civilian
ESDP missions, from the presence of the EU Special
Representatives (EUSRs) to the SAP framework and
annual Regular Progress Reports (by Commission)
on the respective countries. However, drawing on
the experience of the Central and Eastern European
Countries, the region of Western Balkans shows
some important speciic elements that the current EU
enlargement approach may not take fully into account.
The dificulty (and this is where consistency is most
stringently tested) is that the EU is for the irst time in
its history directly involved in assisting in the creation
of its future Member States. Some questions spring to
mind in this respect:
The political commitment of all EU Member States to
the accession of the countries of the Western Balkans
was afirmed at the European Summit in Thessaloniki
in 2003. The framework was set, the commitments of
the political elites in the region seemed clear enough,
and the policy tools were supposedly familiar to all
since the previous wave of Eastern enlargement.
However, for a number of reasons this reassuring sce-
nario (as well as the coherence of EU enlargement
policies) is open to question.
* Jacques Rupnik, Director of Research at CERI-
Sciences Po, Paris, is also Associate Researcher
with the EUISS. He is the author of
Les Banlieues
de l’Europe
(Paris, Presses Sciences Po: 2007).
European Union
Union européenne
1
European Union Institute for Security Studies
 ♦
How far have we moved from security-driven con-
condition for successful integration to the EU? Does
this contribute to or does it rather detract from EU’s
coherence?
tainment towards politically driven integration? Have
we calibrated our instruments accordingly?
♦
Do EU policy instruments meet the real needs in real
♦
US
has recently shown signs of re-engagement
in the Western Balkans which is seen as crucial by a
number of actors in the region. How does this relect
on EU engagement? Should the EU encourage the
continued engagement of the US in the Balkans or,
on the contrary, should it take the view that the scal-
ing down of the US presence should accompany the
process of European integration seen as ‘the only
game in town’?
The
time? For example, does the two year cycle of the
Instrument of Pre-Accession (IPA) planning allow for
suficient lexibility to react to political and economic
developments on the ground?
♦
Are we making the optimal use of our EUSRs? Do
their functions need to be readjusted as the Western
Balkans countries move closer to the EU? Do their
mandates need changing?
♦
ussia
plays a decisive role in the Balkans, be it
as member of the Contact Group and the PIC, be it
through its stance on the Kosovo issue. Russia has
means to assert inluence, not least in relation to en-
ergy supply. To what extent does Russia inluence
the EU’s policy coherence ?
R
♦
What beneits in terms of internal and external co-
ordination and coherence could we expect from
double-hatting the EUSRs? How could their lever-
age in their host-countries increase? What is our
experience with the one case of „EU-double-hatting“
we have in the region (the EUSR for FYROM)?
♦
Turkey
is an important political player in the Western
Balkans and the fact that Turkey has opened en-
largement negotiations with the EU has been noted
by the countries of the Western Balkans. Turkey is
especially relevant as a PIC member in BiH and as
our partner in ESDP missions on the ground (e.g.
EUPM in BiH, EULEX Kosovo). What is our future
strategy on its role? Is the question of the Western
Balkans’ EU future linked to that of Turkey?
♦
How does cooperation and coordination on the
ground between all instruments work? Where do
practical challenges lie? Why are we still perceived
as a host of actors on the EU side and fall short of
presenting a uniied „EU face“ not only vis à vis the
countries in the region but also towards our interna-
tional partners?
♦
Can the current principles of enlargement („re-
gatta principle“, healthy competition, „pull“ carrots
rather than „push“ sticks) ensure deliverables in the
Western Balkans?
♦
Regional cooperation
is a sign of coherence as well
as a conidence building measure. Experience has
shown that regional cooperation can help achieve
sustainable political and economic development and
it should be promoted in all aspects. What more can
we do? Does RCC (Regional Cooperation Council,
successor of Stability Pact) really work? How does
it link with EU efforts? Are there synergies or over-
lap?
♦
How to better coordinate and inetune the EU mes-
sages and those from Member States? Is there room
for a strategy on public diplomacy in the Western
Balkans beyond master messages agreed on spe-
ciic missions?
2. The role of external factors and actors
3. Case studies
Since the EU does not function in a political vacuum,
the role of external factors and actors must be taken
into account. There are certain elements that do inlu-
ence EU’s policies and their coherence, such as:
There are ‘uninished’ states in the Western Balkans:
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Kosovo and - in certain
aspects also - Serbia. Olli Rehn, the EU Commissioner
for Enlargement, has rightly pointed out that ‘protec-
torates’ cannot be integrated in the EU. Nor can unin-
ished states.
♦
NATO enlargement
in Central and Eastern Europe
preceded EU enlargement and there seems to be a
similar pattern in the Balkans with the recent NATO
accession of Croatia and Albania. Is the transatlan-
tic bond and the emphasis on security really a pre-
The two European ‘protectorates’ could be examined
as test cases for consistency of policy and coherence
of EU action:
2
European Union Institute for Security Studies
 Bosnia and Herzegovina:
Kosovo:
From ‘protectorate’ to integration through
nation-state building.
The EU as well as the
larger international community have invested
much in the reconstruction and stabilization
of BiH, inancially, politically and in human re-
sources. How do the results measure up against
the input? Has it been possible to create a sta-
ble, multiethnic state? The answer very much
varies, even among EU Special Representatives/
High Representatives. Former HR Ashdown
feared disintegration whereas, more recently,
HR Lajcak felt that both the Bonn powers and
the HR ofice had become irrelevant. Certainly
BiH is not a fully functional state yet left on
its own. The international presence has en-
sured stability but also fed tendencies to duck
responsibility and full ownership. Can an exit
from the ‘protectorate’-stage and a shift to a
pre-accession agenda be a powerful enough
leverage to push through the institutional and
constitutional reform necessary to develop
the sense of ownership and make BiH a viable
polity?
Dealing with the question of Kosovo, its status
and future has shown political differences be-
tween Member States as well as their irm com-
mitment to inding a common position and a
coordinated approach to the tasks ahead of the
EU in theatre. Differences aside it was possible
to agree on EULEX Kosovo, the largest civilian
mission ever launched under ESDP. Assistance in
building the institutions of Kosovo accompanies
the progressive shift from the ‘protectorate’-
stage to (long-term) pre-accession strategy.
However, on the ground the EU still coexists with
UNMIK and the International Civilian Ofice (ICO).
EULEX is supposed to support the consolidation
of the rule of law of the new state, but it ofi-
cially remains ‘status-neutral’ while it remains
unclear which law applies when in Kosovo. Dif-
ferent courts apply different legislation. Which
state, which international agency, which law?
This surely is the most formidable ‘consistency
challenge’ for EU Special Representative Peter
Feith, and more generally for the EU mission in
Kosovo. It also requires long-term commitment
for which the EU needs public support.
In BiH the EU is present with a civilian (EUPM)
as well as a military ESDP mission (EUFOR Al-
thea). Did taking over from SFOR increase EU
coherence on the ground? Have EUFOR and EUPM
jointly been able to achieve more than the sum
of their individual efforts?
KFOR ensures security in Kosovo. Is it desirable
for the sake of coherence to follow KFOR with a
military ESDP mission? What lessons learned can
we draw in this respect from BiH as a model?
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the EUISS
3
European Union Institute for Security Studies
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